Abstract-Pension benefit guarantees have been introduced in several countries to protect private plan members from the loss of income associated with the termination of an underfunded plan. Most such schemes face financial difficulty. Consequently, policy reforms are being contemplated. Economic theory suggests that such schemes will suffer moral hazard problems. We test a specific theoretical prediction: insured plans will invest more heavily in risky assets. Our test exploits policy differences across Canadian jurisdictions. We find that insured plans invest about 5% more in equities than do similar plans without benefit guarantees.
2003), increases in the risk exposure of the plan's portfolio (Sharpe, 1976; Bodie, 1990; Cooper & Ross, 2003) , and increases in retiree benefits among plans with a higher default risk (Niehaus, 1990) . While these effects have been identified theoretically, little work has been done to assess their empirical relevance. Quantifying the actual magnitude of these moral hazard effects is important to the policy discussion around the reform of private pension systems.
The contribution of this paper is to use newly available data and cross-jurisdiction variation in pension guarantee arrangements to test one specific prediction that emerges from the theoretical literature. In particular, we investigate empirically whether DB pension plans with benefit insurance hold riskier portfolios. To do so, we use a newly constructed Canadian data set that contains information on plan characteristics (including jurisdiction of registration) and their liabilities, total assets, and portfolio allocations.
Identifying the effect of benefit insurance with U.S. data is challenging because the PBGC is a federal program, introduced for all single-employer DB plans in 1974. This means that only time-series variation in guarantee arrangements-the introduction and reform of the program-is available for study. Moreover, the temporal variation generated by recent reforms is confounded because other regulatory changes (notably minimum funding standards) were introduced at the same time. 3 The analysis of pension benefit guarantee systems in most other countries faces similar problems. Consequently, identifying additional sources of variation in guarantee arrangements seems important.
DB plans in Canada are generally under the domain of the financial market supervisors of the province where they are registered. 4 Plans with members in several provinces are registered with the jurisdiction with most members. Currently only the province of Ontario has (in 1980) introduced benefit insurance, the PBGF, inspired by its U.S. counterpart. The administrator of a terminated pension plan applies to the PBGF for funding of insured pensions. 5 Thus, comparison of pension plans in Ontario with similar pension plans registered in other provinces provides an alternative source of variation with which to assess the moral hazard effects of pension guarantees.
Under the PBGF, pensions are guaranteed up to Can$1,000 per month per member. The maximum funding per member has not changed since inception; hence, the real value of benefit coverage has declined over time. Although the PBGF is an account of the provincial government, it is intended to be financially independent and funded through levies on 3 This is illustrated in previous empirical analysis on the effect of the Employment Retirement Security Act (ERISA) on investment decisions of DB pension plans by Cummins et al. (1980) and Cummins and Outreville (1984) . Both papers mention Sharpe's (1976) prediction but consider other ERISA provisions, such as the minimum funding standard, to be more important. Incidentally, Cummins and Outreville (1984) find a move out of (riskier) equities with the introduction of ERISA. 4 The most important provincial supervisor is the Financial Services Commission (FSCO) in Ontario, where almost 50% of plans are registered. The small province of Prince Edward Island does not have a regulatory authority. Some industrial sectors (for example, interprovincial transportation, banks) are under federal supervision by the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions.
5 As such, the PBGF, contrary to U.S. insurance, does not administrate the insured plans. all registered DB plans. Initially the premium rate was a fixed amount per member. In 1990 an additional variable premium rate was introduced depending on the degree of underfunding of the plan. The current financial situation of the PBGF is far from secure. In particular, there is widespread agreement that the insurance would not survive the consequences of bankruptcy of one of the big employers in Ontario with a DB plan. There is less consensus on whether the guarantee fund is implicitly backed by the government. Reform of the system, including the PBGF, has recently been discussed by an expert commission set up by the provincial government (Arthurs, 2008) . Proposed reforms include important increases on the levies to registered plans but no increase in the minimum guaranteed pension. Nielson and Chan (2007) also exploit the comparison between Ontario and other Canadian provinces. However, the data that we use, which we describe below, are newly available. Nielson and Chan show that pension plans with benefit insurance (in Ontario) have fewer assets per member than those without (in other provinces). Nevertheless, Nielson and Chan do not have data on liabilities (only assets), and so the degree of underfunding of different plans is not observed in their data. Thus, while their result may suggest that insurance may exacerbate underfunding (as theory predicts), it cannot be conclusive. Nor can Nielson and Chan look at the portfolio allocation of plans, which is our focus. There is a good reason for focusing on portfolio allocation. In particular, because underfunding has been penalized in the premiums that plan sponsors (firms) must pay to PBGF since 1990, one would expect moral hazard to play out more significantly on other, non-riskrated (that is, nonpriced) margins. It is exactly such a nonpriced margin (the riskiness of portfolios) that we examine.
II. Data
Statistics Canada has two surveys related to private pensions: the biannual Census of Trusteed Pension Funds (TPF) and the annual Pension Plans in Canada (PPIC) survey. TPF collects information on pension assets and portfolio allocation directly from the sponsoring firms or their asset managers, while PPIC is collected from the regulatory authorities and includes aspects of plan characteristics, jurisdiction of registration, membership, and actuarial evaluations. 6 We work with a newly available data set that merges information from these two sources. (See Palardy & Van Rompaey, 2008 , for a description of the linking of the two surveys.) We concentrate on private sector DB plans. Additionally, data on portfolio allocation are collected only for plans with more than Can$10 million in assets. We currently have four waves of data over the period 1998 to 2004. There are 1,378 plans in our sample. The panel is unbalanced and contains 4,398 plan-year observations. Most DB plans invest assets under a trust fund agreement. Some plans pool assets together in what is called a master trust fund (MT). Investment decisions of MTs are taken jointly for all assets within it. Note that an MT is not restricted to only DB plans, and it can include plans registered in several provinces. However, regulation is always at the plan level, and MTs have to comply with the respective legislation for each plan. The unit of observation in TPF is the fund, while it is the plan in PPIC. We conduct our analysis at a plan level. Where plans belong to an MT, we assign all assets (and hence the portfolio shares) to every plan within the MT. As a robustness check, we have also pursued an alternative strategy of aggregating plan characteristics to the MT level and conducting the analysis with the MT as the unit of observation. Results from this analysis are quantitatively similar to the ones we report here and are available from us on request. Table 1 presents summary statistics for the plan-level data set. The average plan has $410 million in assets and around 1,200 members. A third of all members are retired, and 64% of plans are within an MT. We also present summary statistics separated for plans with and without insurance. Slightly more than 50% of all plans in the sample are covered by insurance.
III. Methods
Our empirical strategy is to compare portfolios of insured plans (drawn from Ontario) to uninsured plans (drawn from the rest of Canada) while controlling for differences between the plans. We control for a range of plan characteristics and economic variables using both regression and propensity score matching methods.
We begin by estimating regression models of uninsured portfolio behavior on the control sample. These regressions are of the following form:
where s k ijt is the share of asset k of plan i, registered in jurisdiction j, at time t. X ijt is a set of control variables including plan and provincespecific variables as well as year effects. We estimate equation (1) for two assets: equity (eq) and bonds (bd).
The dependent variable s eq ijt is defined as the share of assets invested in equity measured at market value and including investment in pooled equity instruments. 7 Similarly, s bd ijt is defined as the share of portfolio assets invested in bonds, including pooled bond instruments. As table 1 indicates, the mean equity share per plan is around 41%, with an average of 34% invested in bonds. Hence, these two asset categories constitute by far the most important financial instruments that pension plans use. Note that for equity as for bonds, there is a wide range of individual share values, including, in both cases, shares of 0.
In terms of controls, we include cubic polynomials in (the natural logarithm of) total assets and (the natural logarithm of) the number of members, as well as an interaction between these two measures of plan size. Different investment opportunities might arise for larger plans. For example, smaller plans might not have the financial capacity for direct international equity investments. Similarly, the share of inactive (retired) members is likely to influence portfolio allocation: mature plans (those with a higher share of inactive members) might use a more conservative investment strategy. We therefore include this variable as well as an interaction between the share of inactive members and plan size. Additionally, we include a dummy variable indicating funds that belong to a master trust. In some specifications, we include provincespecific macrovariables (growth, inflation, and employment rates) to control for the overall provincial economic environment. Finally, time effects capture variations in stock market returns. 8 Our purpose in estimating equation (1) on our sample of uninsured plans is to ensure that we have a reasonable model of the counterfactual (uninsured outcome), and to this end, we employ standard RESET tests for omitted variables.
With a satisfactory model of uninsured investment behavior in hand, we then test for the effects of insurance on portfolio shares by using data from both insured and uninsured jurisdictions to estimate regressions of the form
The variable Ins j represents whether a plan possesses a benefit guarantee insurance and is determined by the jurisdiction in which the plan is based. All other variables are as described above. We again estimate 7 Equity investment includes Canadian, U.S., and foreign stocks, as well as pooled equity. Note that survey respondents in principle can distinguish between pooled equity and pooled bond instruments. We do not know to what extent pooled investments that include nonequity assets are reported within pooled equity.
8 Thus, we implicitly make the assumption that pension plans across the country have access to the same financial markets. this equation (2) for two assets: equity (eq) and bonds (bd). Estimation is by OLS; a tobit model gives almost identical results. 9 The theoretical prediction that plans with insurance have an incentive to hold riskier portfolios implies that γ > 0 in the equity regression (s eq ijt ) and γ < 0 in the bond regression (s bd ijt ).
A. Inference
In our first pass at the data, we estimate equation (2) for both equities and bonds with standard errors clustered at the province level to take into account the higher level of aggregation of our main variable (see Moulton, 1990 , for a discussion). Donald and Lang (2007) show that standard asymptotic inference might not apply if some variables are fixed within groups and their number is small. To address this, we follow a two-stage procedure, first regressing the dependent variable (s k ijt ) on plan characteristics and a full set of province-year interactions. 10 In the second stage we use the (4 × 10 = 40) interaction coefficients as the dependent variable and regress them on a constant, year effects, and Ins j . In the second stage, we use weights inversely proportional to the number of plans.
B. Propensity Score Matching
As a check on the regression-based approach just outlined, we also employ propensity score matching to estimate the effect of insurance on plan investment behavior. As is well known, this procedure has the virtue of making checks of common support and covariate balance straightforward.
The outcomes of interest are again the shares of equities and bonds in plan assets. We first estimate a probit model for insurance with the same controls as used in the regression models described. We then impose the common support condition and check covariate balance using standard tests (as described, for example, in Becker & Ichino, 2002) . Finally, we use kernel matching and calculate the average effect of treatment on the treated (ATT) (where the treatment in this context is insurance).
C. Potential Biases
The identifying assumption we must make, of course, is that conditional on the controls just described, plans from other provinces behave as Ontario plans would behave in the absence of the pension guarantee. That is, with the currently available data, we have only cross-sectional variation and cannot allow unobserved provincial differences. While it would be preferable to have both temporal and jurisdictional variation in policy (to allow a difference-in-difference design), we believe that the Canadian jurisdictional variation provides a very useful complement to the purely temporal variation available in the United States and other countries.
We have investigated whether other uncontrollable differences in pension regulation or plan characteristics between Ontario and other Canadian provinces may confound our estimation strategy. To do this, we consulted with industry experts. Leading actuaries identified two potential differences: Ontario is unique in requiring the funding of "grow-in" benefits (benefits that members with sufficient service are entitled to if the plan is wound up-benefits they would have "grown into" had the plan continued), and Ontario has a fair number of unionnegotiated plans that are flat dollar (rather than final pay) plans. Both issues will make the solvency liability larger relative to going concern liability and raise the risk (from the sponsor's point of view) of being required to make additional contributions. Our experts pointed out that the sponsor may in turn choose to reduce risk by investing more in bonds and, in particular, long-duration bonds. Thus the potential confounds that we have been able to identify would tend to bias our empirical strategy against finding evidence of moral hazard.
IV. Results
Estimates of equation (1) are given in the appendix table (columns 1 and 2). Measures of plan size and plan maturity are statistically significant predictors of investment behavior. Using RESET tests for omitted variables, we cannot reject the null hypothesis that these share equations are properly specified (with p-values of 0.82 and 0.61 for equities and bond, respectively.)
Our main results are presented in table 2. In the first row, we show the raw differences in portfolio shares between insured and uninsured plans. 11 On average, the equity share of insured plans is 2 percentage points higher than the equity share of uninsured plans. This is about 5% of the average equity share of 40%. Conversely, the average bond share of insured plans is 1.3 percentage points lower than the bond share of uninsured plans. These differences are strongly statistically significant and match the predictions of theory, but of course they may be confounded by other differences between the insured and uninsured plans. In the following rows, we report the results of different attempts to control these potential biases.
In the second row of table 2, we report the estimates of coefficients on the insurance variable (Ins j ) in our basic specification of equation (2). The point estimates are similar to the sample average differences (1.6 percentage points more in equities and 1.9 percentage points less in bonds) but not statistically significant. In the third row, we report estimates from the two-step procedure that gives more conservative standard errors. The point estimates are even closer to the sample averages (2.1 percentage points more in equities and 1.5 percentage points less in bonds), but the insurance effect is statistically significant at the conventional 5% level in the equity share equation and at the 10% level in the bond share equation.
A referee noted that the linguistic and cultural differences between Quebec and the rest of Canada might be associated with a different investment style. In row 4, we present the results of estimating the same specification as in row 2 but with all Quebec-based plans deleted from the sample. This strengthens the positive effect of insurance on the share of equities but weakens the negative effect on the share of bonds. In row 5 we augment the basic specification of row 2 with province-specific growth, inflation, and employment rates to control for the overall provincial economic environment. This again delivers similar point estimates. Overall, the sign and magnitude of these regression estimates seem very robust across variations in sample and specification.
Finally, in row 6, we report an alternative estimate of the insurance effect based on propensity score matching. After predicting the propensity score on the basis of a probit model, we enforced the common support condition, which resulted in deleting 15 observations (out of 4,398) from the sample. Standard tests did not uncover any violation of covariate balance between the matched treatment and control samples. The resulting estimate of the average effect of the treatment on the treated is again very similar to the sample average difference at 1.7 percentage points more in equities and 1.9 percentage points less in bonds.
V. Discussion and Conclusion
Pension benefit guarantee mechanisms are currently the object of much policy discussion and concern due to the fact that many of these institutions suffer from large financial deficits and are backed (at least implicitly) by the government and, in last instance, the taxpayer. Of particular concern is the possibility that these public insurance programs suffer from moral hazard (on the part of the firms that sponsor insured plans). We test empirically for a specific aspect of moral hazard that is predicted by theoretical models of pension benefit guarantees: pension plans with this kind of insurance will hold riskier investment portfolios. Our test exploits the institutional setting in Canada where only one province, Ontario, has insurance; the others do not. Using a data set that covers the period 1998 to 2004, we find that plans with benefit insurance invest 2 percentage points more in equities than similar uninsured plans and 1 to 2 percentage points less in bonds. Evaluated at the means of our data, this implies that insured plans hold about 5% more of their portfolio in equities.
The result is quite robust and statistically significant when using a quite conservative approach to calculating standard errors. The moral hazard effects that we identify are also, in our view, economically significant. To put the size of the insurance effect in perspective, our estimates imply it would require at the mean a decrease in assets of Can$158 million to obtain the same increase in the share of equity; this represents about 39% of the assets of the average plan. 12 Similarly, in order to obtain the same increase in the share of equity, the share of inactive members would have to decrease by 20 percentage points, which is more than 60% of the average share of 0.33.
Although the variation that our test exploits is one-dimensional (cross jurisdiction, but not time), we have considered potential confounders and argue that this source of variation is the cleanest comparison currently available. Moreover, the key potential confounders that we were able to identify in consultation with industry experts would, if important, bias our estimation strategy against finding a moral hazard effect (so that our estimates of that effect may be an underestimate). Thus, our results constitute significant evidence that pension benefit guarantees do suffer from moral hazard problems. At least until such time as new data make further comparisons possible, policymakers will want to pay attention to this line of evidence.
The new and unusual data on which our estimates are based are currently being extended backward in time, and in the future, this will allow further interesting research. In particular, it would be interesting to examine the effect of the 1990 introduction of higher premiums for underfunded plans. 
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